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How Bad Can It Get?
Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ
6.1 Introduction
As currently legislated, the U.S. Social Security systemr epresents a bad
deal for postwar Americans. Of every dollar postwar Americans have
earned or will earn over their lifetimes, over ﬁve cents will be lost to the
Old-Age and Survivor Insurance System (OASI) in the form of payroll
taxes paid in excess of beneﬁts received. OASI’s 5 percent lifetime net tax
rate can also be described in terms of the internal rate of return it delivers
to contributors. This rate—1.86 percent—is less than half the rate cur-
rently being paid on inﬂation-indexed long-term government bonds, which
arem uch safer. Of course, Social Security is an insurance as well as a net
tax system. However, if it is viewed as an insurance company, it is clear
that the insurance OASI sells (or, rather, forces households to buy) is no
bargain. The load charged averages sixty-six cents per dollar of premium.
The bad deal that Social Security oﬀers postwar Americans is, of
course, payback for the great deal it oﬀered and still oﬀers prewar Ameri-
2071. Saying that prewar Americans received a good deal from Social Security and that post-
war Americans are, as a result, receiving a bad deal is a positive, not a normative statement.
Some may view this outcome as generationally just, while others view it as exploitive.
cans.1 These generations were enrolled during the beginning of Social Se-
curity and received very generous beneﬁts compared with their tax contri-
butionst othe system. That postwar Americans are receiving less than a
market rate of return on their contributions is not news. What is news is the
precise degree to which postwar Americans are being hurt by the system.
Understanding their treatment necessitates an actuarial approach because
Social Security’s beneﬁt payout depends on the vagaries of longevity, fertil-
ity, marital arrangements, and lifetime earnings. Capturing the full range
of these outcomes requires longitudinal data that follow individuals from
their initial encounters with the OASI system through the end of their
lives. Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (1999, as well as their chapter 5 in
this volume), Liebman, and Feldstein-Liebman (chapters 1 and 7, respec-
tively,i nthis volume) use past longitudinal data for individuals or cohorts
and then project future data for their observations. Our study takes a
diﬀerent approach, namely simulating complete lifetime histories for indi-
viduals. The data used here are from CORSIM, an extensive microsimula-
tion model developed by Steven Caldwell and his colleagues at Cornell
University (see Caldwell 1996; Caldwell and Morrison 1999).
Caldwell et al. (1999) married CORSIM’s simulated data to a highly
detailed Social Security beneﬁt estimator developed by Economic Security
Planning, Inc., as part of its ﬁnancial planning software package, ESPlan-
ner. The resulting study, which produced a range of ﬁndings, including
those mentioned above, adopted one major counterfactual assumption—
that Social Security would be able to deliver on its beneﬁt promises with-
outr aising its rate of taxation. Unfortunately, this assumption is far from
the reality. Instead, Social Security faces a staggering long-term funding
problem. According to the system’s own actuaries, meeting promised ben-
eﬁt payments on an ongoing basis requires raising the OASDI 10.8 tax
rate immediately and permanently by two-ﬁfths!
This paper uses the machinery developed in Caldwell et al. (1999) to
study how bad Social Security’s treatment of postwar Americans would
be if Social Security maintains its pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) structure, but
either raises payroll taxes or cuts beneﬁts to bring the system’s ﬁnances
into present value balance. The alternatives include immediate tax in-
creases, elimination of the ceiling on taxable payroll, immediate and sus-
tained beneﬁt cuts, an increase in the system’s normal retirement ages be-
yond those currently legislated, a switch from wage to price indexing in
calculating beneﬁts, and a limit on the price indexation of beneﬁts. The
choice among these and other alternatives has important consequences
in determining which postwar generations and which members of those
generations pay for the system’s long-term funding shortfall.
208 Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ2. This section draws heavily on Caldwell et al.’s (1999) description of CORSIM and
ESPLanner’s beneﬁt calculator.
Thep aper proceeds in section 6.2 with a brief literature review. Section
6.3 describes CORSIM and ESPlanner’s Social Security Beneﬁt Estima-
tor.2 Section 6.4 reviews the ﬁndings of Caldwell et al. (1999). Section 6.5
describes ten alternative tax increases and beneﬁt reductions that would
improve the system’s present value ﬁnances and proceeds to show the dis-
tribution of the additional burden that these policies impose both across
postwar cohorts and across diﬀerent demographic groups within each
postwar cohort. This section also reports the contribution that each policy
option makes to shoring up the system’s ﬁnances. Section 6.6 summarizes
the main points of the chapter and concludes.
6.2 Some Relevant Literature
An umber of past studies have examined Social Security’s treatment of
itsp articipants by focusing on stylized cases—particular types of married
couples and single individuals who diﬀer by age of birth, sex, race, and
lifetime earnings and who all live for the same number of years. These
studies include Nichols and Schreitmueller (1978), Myers and Schobel
(1993), Hurd and Shoven (1985), Boskin, Kotlikoﬀ,P u ﬀert, and Shoven
(1987), Steuerle and Bakija (1994), and Diamond and Gruber (1997).
Steuerle and Bakija’s 1994 study is fairly representative of the past liter-
ature and may be the best-known prior study. It considers three alternative
lifetime wage patterns: low, average, and high, where “low” refers to 45
percent of the average value of Social Security–covered earnings, “aver-
age” refers to the average value of Social Security–covered earnings, and
“high” refers to the value of the maximum taxable level of Social Security–
covered earnings. For each cohort reaching age sixty-ﬁve between the years
1940 and 2050, Steuerle and Bakija calculate the lifetime net beneﬁts from
Social Security for singles and married couples for alternative sets of these
three lifetime wage patterns. For example, they consider married couples
in which both spouses have low earnings, one spouse has low earnings and
the other average earnings, and one spouse has average earnings and the
other high earnings. Steuerle and Bakija use their assumed earnings trajec-
tories to compute retirement, dependent, and survivor beneﬁts. In the case
of survivor beneﬁts, the authors consider all possible truncations of the
earnings trajectories resulting from all possible alternative dates of early
death, although not from any other sources. Each of the various state-
contingent beneﬁts is actuarially discounted to form a lifetime net beneﬁt.
Steuerle and Bakija’s 1994 ﬁndings generally accord with those of previ-
ous studies: They show that today’s and tomorrow’s workers will fare much
worse under Social Security than current and past retirees; that men are
being disadvantaged relative to women; and that single individuals and
Social Security’s Treatment of Postwar Americans 2093. Steuerle and Bakija’s study pays careful attention to detail and provides an impressive
and extensive array of calculations. However, it raises ﬁve concerns. First, in considering only
uninterrupted earnings histories, the study omits a potentially very important source of intra-
and intergenerational heterogeneity in lifetime Social Security net beneﬁts. Second, in as-
suming ﬁxed lifetime marital status, the study ignores the role of divorce and remarriage in
altering Social Security net beneﬁts. Third, in assuming that receipt of Social Security retire-
ment beneﬁts starts at workers’ ages of normal retirement, the study ignores beneﬁt reduc-
tionsf or age, delayed retirement credits, beneﬁt recomputation, and the earnings test—all
of whichc an materially aﬀect Social Security’s lifetime net beneﬁts. Fourth, the study uses
an extremely low real interest rate, just 2 percent, in discounting future net beneﬁts. Fifth,
in failing to consider workers who earn above the taxable maximum, the study fails to capture
an important regressive element of the system—the fact that for very high-income single
individuals and couples, Social Security’s net lifetime taxation is a smaller fraction of lifetime
earnings than it is for Steuerle and Bakija’s “high” earners.
two-earner couples face higher net taxes than do single-earner couples.
The authors also claim that “for most of Social Security’s history, the sys-
tem has been regressive within generations. That is, within a given cohort
of retirees, net transfers have been inversely related to need: people with
the highest lifetime incomes have tended to receive the largest absolute
transfers above and beyond what they contributed.”3
Like our paper, the 1999 study by Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass repre-
sents a diﬀerent approach—namely, considering the dispersion of all po-
tential outcomes. However, unlike in our paper, Coronado, Fullerton, and
Glass examine actual data (from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics),
rather than synthetic data. Their paper represents a real step forward in
determining exactly how postwar Americans are being treated. Although
their focus is on postretirement beneﬁts and they do not include as much
detail in their calculation of OASI beneﬁts, their ﬁndings are broadly con-
sistent with those presented here and in Caldwell et al. (1999).
6.3 CORSIM and ESPlanner’s Social Security Beneﬁt Calculator
As mentioned, we use two tools in our analysis—CORSIM, a dynamic
microsimulation model, and ESPlanner’s Social Security beneﬁt calcula-
tor—to calculate OASI lifetime net taxes (taxes paid less beneﬁts received)
forb abyb oomers and their children.
6.3.1 CORSIM
CORSIM begins in 1960 with the representative sample of Americans
surveyed in the 1960 U.S. Census Public-Use Microdata Sample. This data
seti sao ne-in-one-thousand sample, which means that one of every thou-
sand Americans alive in 1960 is included. The census survey provides
much, but not all, of the information needed as baseline data. The remain-
ing information is imputed to the 1960 sample from a variety of sources.
CORSIM “grows” the 1960 sample demographically and economically in
one-year intervals through the year 2100. Demographic growth refers to
210 Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ4. CORSIM’s other economic processes include consumption expenditures; saving; fed-
eral, state, and local income and property taxation; individual asset holdings; inheritance;
and disability.
5. For example, if the model generates fewer (more) than the expected number of births in
ag ivenp eriod, the fertility probabilities for women of childbearing age in the period are
scaled upward (downward). One can scale continuous variables in a simple linear fashion or
by using more complex nonlinear methods.
birth, death, and immigration, entry into the marriage market, family for-
mation, family dissolution, and the attainment of schooling. Economic
growth refers to working or not working, choosing annual weeks worked,
and determining weekly labor earnings.4
As detailed in Caldwell et al. (1996), these and other CORSIM pro-
cesses are determined by over 1,000 distinct equations, hundreds of rule-
based algorithms, and over 5,000 parameters. Data used to estimate and
test the separate equation-based modules were drawn from large national
Microdata ﬁles, including High School and Beyond (HSB), the National
Longitudinal Survey (NLS), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLS-Y), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the National Lon-
gitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS), the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), and the U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). Data
used to construct the rule-based modules and to compute alignment fac-
tors are drawn from another six ﬁles plus miscellaneous sources.
CORSIM’s alignment procedures ensure that the model’s modules,
whicha re,i np a rt, deterministic and, in part, stochastic, are benchmarked,
on ay e ar-by-year basis, to historical and projected future aggregates.
These aggregates are typically group speciﬁc, such as the average earnings
of whitef e males ages nineteen to twenty-ﬁve who are married with chil-
dren in the home and working part time. Benchmarking is performed by
calculating group-speciﬁc alignment factors, which are applied within each
group to the values of the sample member’s predicted continuous variable
(such as earnings) and probabilities (such as the chance of divorcing).
These adjustment factors are then used in a second pass of the model
through the population.5
Our CORSIM data were produced by running CORSIM from 1960
through 2100. From this master sample, we selected (a) all never-married
males and females born between 1945 and 2000 who lived to at least age
ﬁfteen, (b) all males born between 1945 and 2000 who married women
born between 1945 and 2010 and lived to at least age ﬁfteen, and (c) all fe-
males born between 1945 and 2000 who married males born between 1945
and 2000, all of whom lived to at least age ﬁfteen. Selecting the sample in
this manner omits (a) males born between 1945 and 2000 who married
females born either before 1945 or after 2010 and (b) females born be-
tween 1945 and 2000 who married males born either before 1945 or after
2000. Thus, at the early end of the sample we lose some males who married
Social Security’s Treatment of Postwar Americans 211older women and some women who married older men. At the late end of
the sample we lose some males who married very much younger women
and some females who married younger men.
Whatever bias this selection process introduces should be absent for
cohorts born in the central years of our sample. For these cohorts, we are
presumably omitting very few, if any, observations. Take, for example,
those born in 1965. The males born in 1965 who are left out of the sample
are those who either married women twenty or more years older than
themselves or married women forty-ﬁve or more years younger than them-
selves. Those females born in 1965 who are omitted from the sample either
married males twenty or more years older than themselves or married
males thirty-ﬁve or more years younger than themselves.
Sample Size
Table 6.1 decomposes the number of observations by birth cohort, life-
time earnings quintile, sex, race, and education. The total number of
sample observations in 68,688 individuals. The observations are almost
equally divided among men and women. They are also fairly evenly dis-
tributed across our eleven cohorts deﬁned over ﬁve years of birth (six years
for the youngest cohort). For convenience, we refer in the text to each of
the cohorts by their oldest members’ year of birth. Thus cohort 45 refers
to those born between 1945 and 1949, cohort 50 refers to those born be-
tween 1950 and 1954, and so on up through cohort 90, which refers to six,
rather than ﬁve, separate birth cohorts, speciﬁcally, those born in the years
1995 through 2000.
Sixteen percent of the observations are nonwhite, and 41 percent have
oneo rm orey ears of college education. These percentages increase for suc-
cessive cohorts. Eleven percent ofc o h o r t4 5i sn o n w h ite, compared with
21 percent of cohort 95. Thirty-one percent of cohort 45 observations have
at least one yearo fc o l l e g ee d u c a t i o n ,c o m p a r e dw i t h4 6p e r c e n to fo b s e r -
vations in cohort 95.
Thet able sorts observations into three lifetime earnings quintiles: the
lowest 20 percent of lifetime earners, the middle 20 percent of lifetime
earners, and the top 20 percent of lifetime earners. “Lifetime earnings” is
deﬁned as the present value of an individual’s annual earnings from age
eighteen through the end of his or her life discounted at a 5 percent real
interest rate. The lifetime earnings quintiles are deﬁned with respect to the
overall distribution of lifetime earnings. This quintile deﬁnition holds even
when we consider results for speciﬁc demographic groups. Thus, when we
refer to the non–college educated in the highest quintile of the lifetime
earnings distribution, we do not mean the 20 percent highest earners
among those without a college education, but rather those of the non–
college educated who end up among the top 20 percent of all lifetime earn-
ers. As one would expect (and as table 6.1 shows), 29 percent of all female
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































e6. Note that the male and female cohort 85 gap in life expectancies between lowest and
highest quintiles are smaller than the corresponding gap for male and female observations
combined. The reason is that in forming the overall life expectancies, low quintile males and
high quintile females receive relatively little weight because there are relatively few of them.
This weighting pattern makes the average life expectancy of all those in the lowest quintile
closer to that of females in that quintile and makes the average life expectancy of all those
in the highest quintile closer to that of males in that quintile. Since, other things being equal,
males have lower life expectancies than do females, this weighting pattern reduces the size
of the top-bottom quintile gap relative to the gaps of either sex calculated separately.
observations fall in the lowest lifetime earnings quintile, compared to only
12 percent in the highest quintile. Similar remarks apply to the distribution
of observations for the nonwhite and non–college educated groups.
Longevity
Since Social Security pays its beneﬁts in the form of annuities, how long
onel ivesi sacritical factor in determining how much one beneﬁts from the
system. Table 6.2 reports average ages of death by cohort and demographic
group. As one would expect, later-born cohorts live longer, females outlive
males, whites outlive nonwhites, and those with a college education outlive
those without. The average age of death for the ﬁrst ﬁve cohorts is 79.5,
compared with 81.1 for the last ﬁve. Across the entire sample, females out-
live males by 6.3 years, but this gap in longevity narrows somewhat be-
tween the earliest and latest cohorts. The longevity gaps between whites
and nonwhites of about two years, and between the college educated and
non–college educated of about 1.5 years, are fairly stable over time.
There is also a clear correlation between lifetime earnings and average
length of life. Part of this correlation runs from earnings to lifespan; in
other words, the mortality probabilities used in the CORSIM model are
smaller the higher is the level of earnings. However, part runs from lifespan
to earnings: Those with shorter lifetimes have fewer years during which
to worka nd may, for that reason, have lower lifetime earnings. Across all
cohorts, the diﬀerence in longevity between those in the bottom and those
in the top quintiles is 1.2 years. However, if one looks within male and
female subpopulations, these diﬀerences are much larger. Compare, for
example, highest- and lowest-quintile life expectancies for men who are in
cohort 85. The diﬀerence is 7.1 years. For females in the same cohort, the
gap is 2.8 years between the top and bottom quintiles.6
Longevity diﬀerences between the college-educated and non–college ed-
ucated are worth noting. As mentioned, there is a signiﬁcant college–non-
college diﬀerence in average longevity. Given the level of education, how-
ever, there is very little diﬀerence in life expectancies across lifetime income
quintiles. Indeed, college graduates in the lowest quintile of the lifetime
earnings distribution have a higher life expectancy than do non-college
graduates in the top quintile. Thus, education appears to trump income in
explaining longevity.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.3 shows the huge gulf that separates high and low earners with
respect to the present value of lifetime earnings. For cohort 45, average
lifetime earnings in the top quintile are thirty-three times those in the bot-
tom quintile. For cohort 95, the corresponding factor is thirty-nine. The
table also shows that postwar males have much higher average lifetime
earnings than do postwar females. In cohort 85, for example, females aver-
age $398,300 in lifetime earnings, compared with $731,800 for males. This
over-$300,000 diﬀerential is much larger than the white-nonwhite and
college-non–college educated diﬀerentials in cohort 85. Indeed, in this co-
hort, the white-nonwhite diﬀerential is less than $100,000 and the college-
non–college diﬀerential is less than $200,000. In combination, these dif-
ferentials can be very sizeable, although their interactions are not neces-
sarily positive. Take white, college-educated males in cohort 85 and non-
white, non–college educated females in the same cohort. The lifetime
earnings diﬀerence, which is in excess of $500,000, is nonetheless smaller
than the sum of the separate male-female, white-nonwhite, and college
educated-non–college educated diﬀerentials.
Although lifetime earnings are higher in general for men than for
women, for whites than for nonwhites, and for the college-educated than
for the non–college educated, these diﬀerences do not necessarily extend
to within-quintile comparisons. For example, the lowest quintile males
have lower lifetime earnings than the lowest quintile females.
Another prominent feature of table 6.3 is the growth over time in life-
time earnings measured in 1998 dollars. This reﬂects historic as well as
projected growth in real wages. As a comparison of results for diﬀerent
members of cohorts 1945–49 and 1995–2000 makes clear, lifetime earnings
of successive generations are growing much more rapidly for women than
form en,a nd somewhat more rapidly for whites than for nonwhites and
for the college-educated than for the non–college educated.
6.3.2 ESPLanner’s Social Security Beneﬁt Calculator (SSBC)
ESPLanner’s OASI beneﬁt calculator calculates retirement, spousal,
widow(er), mother, father, children, and divorcee beneﬁts as well as OASI
taxes. It does so by taking into account Social Security’s earnings test,
family beneﬁt maximums, actuarial reductions and increases, beneﬁt re-
computations, eligibility rules, the ceiling on taxable earnings, and legis-
lated changes in normal retirement ages. Although the beneﬁt calculator
considers the OASI system in great detail, it leaves out the disability insur-
ance (DI) portion of Social Security as well as the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program. It also ignores the taxation of Social Security bene-
ﬁtsu n der federal and state income taxes. Both of these omissions lead to
an understatement of Social Security’s redistribution from the lifetime rich
to the lifetime poor.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eCalculation of OASI beneﬁts is extremely complex. The Social Security
Handbook describing the rules governing these beneﬁts runs over 500
pages. Even so, on many key points, the Handbook is incomplete and mis-
leading. This assessment is shared by the Social Security senior actuaries
whow ere consulted in developing SSBC. Their assistance, which proved
invaluable, came in the form of both extensive discussions and the trans-
mittal of numerous documents detailing various aspects of Social Secur-
ity’s beneﬁt formulae. The Social Security actuaries also introduced us
to their ANYPIA program, which calculates primary insurance amounts
(PIAs). Unfortunately, ANYPIA considers only one person at a time and
does notp ermit the calculation of multiple, interdependent beneﬁts of
household members. Consequently, ANYPIA did not provide an alterna-
tive to developing SSBC, although we have used it, where possible, to
check SSBC’s accuracy. We refer readers to Caldwell et al. (1998) for a
detailed discussion of SSBC’s calculation of each type of beneﬁt.
6.4 OASDI’s Treatment of Postwar Americans
Assuming No Tax Hikes or Beneﬁt Cuts
Tables 6.4 through 6.6 summarize a number of the ﬁndings in Caldwell
et al. (1999) about Social Security’s treatment of current generations as-
suming no future change in Social Security tax and beneﬁt provisions.
Table 6.4 reports cohort-speciﬁc OASI lifetime net tax rates for the lowest,
middle, and highest lifetime earnings quintiles and for diﬀerent demo-
graphic groups. These tax rates are calculated by dividing (a) the sum of
lifetime net taxes of all individuals in a given cell by (b) the sum of those
individuals’ lifetime earnings.T hese lifetime variables are present values
(discounted at a real rate of 5 percent), measured in 1998 dollars and cal-
culated as of the year the individual is age eighteen. The taxes and beneﬁts
used in forming the lifetime net tax rate are all OASI taxes paid by cell
members plus those paid by their employers and all OASI beneﬁts received
by cell members. Thus, spousal and widow(er) beneﬁts are credited to the
recipients—the dependent spouse or widow(er)—and not to the spouse
whop aid the taxes that procured those beneﬁts. For example, a spousal
beneﬁt paid to a husband is counted as his beneﬁt notwithstanding the
fact that the beneﬁt is based on his wife’s earnings record.
Table 6.5 reports cohort-speciﬁc OASI internal rates of return, again
broken down by lifetime earnings quintiles. The cell-speciﬁc internal rates
of return were determined by ﬁnding the discount rate that equated the
present value of the aggregate tax paymentso fc ell observations to the
present value of the aggregate beneﬁt receipts of cell observations.
Table 6.6 shows cell-speciﬁc OASI equivalent wealth tax rates. These
tax rates are calculated by (a) present valuing to age sixty-ﬁve (accumulat-
ing to age sixty-ﬁve or, as appropriate, discounting to age sixty-ﬁve) all













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.7. We take a 5 percent real rate of return as a reasonable approximation of available market
rates of return, comprising of a risk-free rate of 3.5 percent and a risk premium of 1.5 per-
cent.
8. Since surviving spouses are eligible for survivor beneﬁts provided they have been mar-
ried for nine or more months, we refer here only to the case of marriages of less than ten
years that end in divorce in which a spouse dies after the couple has divorced.
9. Note that we allocate beneﬁts to recipients rather than to the individuals whose earnings
records generated the beneﬁts. Hence, load factors are likely to be understated for those
demographic groups who receive sizable beneﬁts based on the earnings of individuals belong-
ing to some other demographic group. Women, for example, have lower earnings and live
longer than men on average and, therefore, receive spousal and survivor beneﬁts based on
lifetime OASI taxes paid by all cell members, (b) doing the same for all
lifetime OASI beneﬁts received by all cell members, and (c) forming the
number one minus the ratio of the collective within-cell lifetime beneﬁts
to the collective within-cell lifetime taxes. Again, a 5 percent rate of dis-
count is used in ﬁnding present values. If the lifetime beneﬁts of cell mem-
bers equal their lifetime taxes, the implicit OASI wealth tax rate equals
zero.I flifetime beneﬁts of cell members are zero, the implicit wealth tax
rate is 100 percent.
Ther easonw er efer to this tax rate as an implicit wealth tax is that the
accumulated-to-age-sixty-ﬁve lifetime tax payments of cell members
would be the extra net wealth they would have at age sixty-ﬁve if (a) there
were no OASI program, (b) all OASI payroll tax contributions were saved
and invested by cell members as a group, and (c) these savings earned a
real rate of return of 5 percent.7 If the OASI wealth tax rate is 0.66, this
means that Social Security has, in eﬀect, taxed away two-thirds of that net
wealth when the surviving cell members reach age sixty-ﬁve. Another way
to think about OASI is that itr epresents an insurance policy. From this
perspective, the contributions are insurance premiums and the implicit
wealth tax is the load charged by the OASI insurance company. A wealth
tax rate of 0.66 translates into a load of 66 cents per dollar of premium.
Since we are pooling together the outcomes of all cell observations in
forming the cell entries in tables 6.4 through 6.6 as well as subsequent
tables, we are making actuarial calculations. Individuals who die young
and receive beneﬁts for only a few years are pooled with those who die
olda nd receive beneﬁts for many years. Individuals who parent multiple
children and, if they die when the children are young, endow their children
with child survivor beneﬁts and their spouses with mother/father beneﬁts,
arep ooled with those who have no children and, therefore, generate no
such beneﬁts. Individuals who are married for ten or more years and, be-
cause they have the right constellation of earnings and death dates vis-a `-
vis their spouses, provide their spouses with spousal and survivor beneﬁts,
arep ooled with both individuals who never married and with individuals
whom a rry but are divorced before ten years and, consequently, disqualify
their former spouses for such beneﬁts.8,9
228 Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀtheir husbands’ earnings histories. The opposite would be true for men. Hence, in drawing
conclusions about the size of load factors, it may be appropriate to focus on average wealth
tax rates across all groups.
6.4.1 Lifetime Net Tax Rates Under the Existing System
Table 6.4 documents several key features of the current OASI system.
First, with the exception of cohort 50, lifetime net tax rates exceed 5 per-
cent for almost all postwar cohorts. Second, there is no clear cohort time
trend. Younger cohorts are not, under current law, generally facing higher
lifetime net tax rates than older cohorts. Third, lifetime net tax rates are
negative for members of all cohorts who fall within the lowest 20 percent
of their cohort’s lifetime earnings distribution. Fourth, the lifetime net tax
rates of the middle class (the middle or 3rd quintile of the lifetime earnings
distribution) exceed those of the highest quintile of the lifetime earnings
distribution.
Thus, the current OASI systemr epresents an overall bad deal for post-
war Americans when viewed from an actuarial perspective. One might
expect the deal to be worsening over time, given that the OASI tax rate
has risen over time. However, life expectancy has increased, and work ex-
pectancy has decreased. Hence, younger postwar cohort members are re-
ceiving beneﬁts for more years and paying taxes for fewer years than are
older postwar cohort members.
TheO ASI program signiﬁcantly hurts Americans as a group, but it also
signiﬁcantly helps poor postwar Americans. Take, for example, members
of cohort 80 in the lowest lifetime earnings quintile. OASI is, in eﬀect,
handing them 4.8 cents on balance for every dollar they earn. Although
the system is highly progressive at the bottom of the lifetime earnings dis-
tribution, it is somewhat regressive at the top. The regressive nature of the
system arises from the ceiling on covered earnings that limits the payroll
tax contributions of high earners as well as the beneﬁts high earners re-
ceive. Although high earners are facing somewhat lower rates of lifetime
net OASI contributions than the middle class, they are still paying, in ab-
solute terms, much more than the middle class. To see this, multiply, for
example, table 6.4’s 5.3 percent lifetime net tax rate for the highest quintile
in cohort 80 by $1,671,700—cohort 80’s average lifetime earnings. The
resulting $88,600 is over ﬁve times the corresponding absolute net tax of
$15,372 paid, on average, by members of cohort 80’s middle quintile.
Table 6.4 breaks down the lifetime net tax rates by demographic group.
Men pay about 1 percent more of their lifetime earnings to OASI in net
taxes than do women. The higher male net tax rates obtain even within
the same lifetime earnings quintiles. Indeed, the poorest one-ﬁfth of males
in each cohort all face positive lifetime net tax rates, whereas the poorest
one-ﬁfth of women in each cohort all face negative lifetime net tax rates.
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ceipt of OASI dependent and survivor beneﬁts. Nonwhites, because of
their shorter life expectancies, face slightly higher (about a third of a per-
centage point) lifetime OASI net tax rates than do whites. This is true
within as well as across lifetime earnings quintiles. College-educated work-
ers face somewhat lower lifetime OASI net tax rates (about three-ﬁfths of
ap ercentage point) than non–college educated workers. This diﬀerence is
particularly pronounced among college-educated and non–college edu-
cated observations in the ﬁrst quintile.
6.4.2 Internal Rates of Return Paid by the Existing System
Table 6.5 indicates that postwar cohorts, as a group, are receiving a
roughly 2 percent rate of return on their OASI contributions. Relative to
the nearly 4 percent safe rate of return currently available on inﬂation-
indexed long-term government treasury bonds, 2 percent is quite low, par-
ticularly given the fact that future OASI tax payments and beneﬁt receipts
areh i ghly uncertain. Indeed, the nonidiosyncratic component of these tax
payments and beneﬁt receipts is closely linked to overall labor productivity
growth. Because labor productivity growth is highly correlated with the
economy’s performance, which, in turn, is highly correlated with the per-
formance of the stock market, the stock market’s real rate of return may
be a reasonable ratet oc o m p a r ew i t hthe 2 percent being paid Social Secu-
rity. The average real return on the stock market since 1926 is 7.7 per-
cent—a very far cry from 2 percent!
Whilep o stwar Americans are, as ag roup, receiving a quite low rate of
return from the system, the poorest among them are earning a very re-
spectable return—roughly 6 percent. The counterpart of this much better
deal for the poor is a much worse deal for those in the top quintile. Their
rate of return is below 1 percent. In addition to this large diﬀerence be-
tween rates of return for high and low earners, there is a large diﬀerence
in rates of return between men and women. The diﬀerences between male
and female internal rates of return are smaller at higher quintiles. In the
case of cohort 70, for example, the diﬀerence is 2.6 percentage points in
the lowest quintile versus 0.8 percentage points for the highest quintile.
This may reﬂect the fact that a larger fraction of women in the lower life-
time earnings quintiles have longer spells of nonparticipation in the labor
market.Hence,womeninthesequintilesmaycollectbeneﬁtsbasedontheir
spouses’ earnings records with greater frequency than do men—making
their beneﬁts larger relative to their earnings. In contrast, women in higher
lifetime earnings quintiles mostly collect beneﬁts based on their own earn-
ings records. Their internal rates are, nevertheless, larger than those of
men because women collect survivor beneﬁts based on the spouses’ higher
earnings records and because they possess greater longevity.
The diﬀerences between male and female internal rates of return are
230 Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ10. While we follow the actuaries in using a 3 percent real discount rate in assessing the
present value budget impact of alternative policies, a 3 percent discount rate seems far too
low for the individual money’s worth calculations we make in forming lifetime net tax rates
and implicit OASDI wealth taxes. Why? Because future OASI taxes and beneﬁts are highly
uncertain and, from an individual perspective, should be discounted for their risk. One could
smaller for later cohorts. For cohort 95, for example, the diﬀerence in the
lowest quintile is only 1.4 percentage points. In the highest quintile, it is
only 0.5 percentage points. The decline in the diﬀerence for later cohorts
may reﬂect the increase over time in women’s labor force participation—
leading to fewer women’s collecting beneﬁts based on the spouse’s earnings
records. Interestingly, and unlike the lifetime net tax measure, the rate-of-
return criterion suggests that nonwhites fare just as well as whites and that
the non–college educated fare just as well as the college-educated.
6.4.3 Implicit Wealth Taxes Levied by the Current System
Table 6.6 shows the point made above, that roughly two-thirds of every
dollar paid by postwar Americans to the OASI system represents a pure
tax. Since two-thirds of the 10.6 percent OASI nominal tax rate equals 7.1
percent, the average eﬀective OASI tax rate is 7.1 percent. For high earn-
ers, the implicit tax rate is close to eight cents on each dollar earned up to
the covered earnings ceiling. For low earners, the system not only pays
back in full each dollar paid in, but also provides about forty-ﬁve cents on
the dollar as a subsidy. Not all poor individuals receive a subsidy, however.
None of the poorest ﬁfth of males in the eleven cohorts can expect to get
back more than they pay in. Instead, they can expect that for each dollar
paid in taxes, they will receive back only seventy-three cents in beneﬁts;
that is, they will lose twenty-seven cents per dollar contributed to OASI.
Poor women, on the other hand, can anticipate receiving beneﬁts equal to
1.67 cents per dollar paid in (a subsidy of sixty-seven cents). OASI’s im-
plicit wealth tax rates are also higher for nonwhites than whites and for
the college-educated than the non–college educated.
6.5 Alternative Policies to Shore Up Social Security’s Finances
This section examines ten potential policy reforms, all of which have
been popularly discussed, that would help shore up Social Security’s long-
term ﬁnances. To set the stage for their analysis, we ﬁrst point out that the
system’s present value budget imbalance is very much larger than is gener-
ally understood or being publicly acknowledged by the system’s trustees.
6.5.1 Social Security’s Financial Dilemma
How large is the total present value imbalance of the OASI system? If
we discount all future taxes and beneﬁts at a 3 percent real rate, we arrive
atap r esent value imbalance of $8.1 trillion.10 This ﬁgurer epresents the
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long-term ﬁnances.
11. In forming the present values, we use SSA’s most recent projections of payroll tax
revenue and OASI beneﬁts. We take average annual growth rates of OASI taxes and beneﬁts
during the ﬁnal twenty years of the seventy-ﬁve-year projections and grow the year-75 taxes
and beneﬁts through the year 2300. Discounting the diﬀerence between taxes and beneﬁts at
ar eal discount rate of 3 percent per year, adding the current value of the OASI trust fund,
and making an adjustment for the post-2300 imbalance yields the total present value imbal-
ance reported in the text.
12. In a telephone conservation, Social Security’s deputy chief actuary, Stephen C. Goss,
indicated thath ealsoﬁ ndsa3 8p ercent present value imbalance, although his calculations
include the DI system. According to Goss, the tax hike required to balance the OASDI
system in present value would be 4.7 percentage points.
diﬀerence between (a) the present value of all future beneﬁt payments and
(b) the sum of the present value of future payroll tax revenue plus the cur-
rent OASI trust fund.11
The immediate and permanent tax hike required to generate $8.1 trillion
more in present value and, thus, eliminate the OASI budget imbalance is
4p ercentage points or 38 percent of the post-2000 OASI tax rate of 10.6
percent.12 This requisite 38 percent tax hike is over twice the required rate
increase reported in the 1999 Trustee’s Report of the Social Security Admin-
istration. The discrepancy between the tax hike that is needed and the one
the trustees say is needed is easily explained. Unlike our calculation, the
Trustees’ Report uses a truncated projection horizon—seventy-ﬁve years—
whichi gnores the enormous deﬁcits forecast in years seventy-six and there-
after.
One might think that looking out seventy-ﬁve years is far enough, but
with each passing year, another “out-year” is added to the current seventy-
ﬁve-year projection horizon. If these out-years involve large deﬁcits, the
current seventy-ﬁve-yearp r esent value imbalance will worsen. This is pre-
cisely what has been happening since 1983, when the Greenspan Com-
mission “saved” Social Security. Indeed, about one-third of the current
seventy-ﬁve-year long-term imbalance in Social Security’s ﬁnances reﬂects
the fact that since 1983, sixteen years of very large deﬁcits have been added
to the seventy-ﬁve-year projection horizon. Another third of the seventy-
ﬁve-year imbalance that has arisen since 1983 reﬂects mistakes the actuar-
ies made in their forecasting techniques. The ﬁnal third reﬂects overly opti-
mistic assumptions the actuaries made about the growth of taxable payroll,
take-up rates of disability beneﬁts, and demographics.
Thes ize of the tax hike (38 percent) needed to produce presentv alue
balance, not just over the next 75 years but over the entire long run, is even
more remarkable given that it was calculated using the relatively optimistic
“intermediate” demographic and economic assumptions. Two assump-
tionsi nthe intermediate set seem particularly sanguine. One is that im-
provements in longevity will slow down over the next several decades com-
pared with the rate of such improvements observed over the past twenty
years. Indeed, if one believes the intermediate longevity forecast, it will
232 Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ13. Those achieving age sixty-ﬁve during the year 2001 are assigned an NRA of sixty-ﬁve
yearsa nd sixmonths; those achieving age sixty-ﬁve during the year 2002 are assigned NRA
sixty-six, and so on, until the NRA reaches seventy.
14. The PIA equals 90 percent of the ﬁrst X dollars of AIME plus 32 percent of the AIME
exceeding X dollars but less than Y dollars plus 15 percent of the AIME in excess of Y
dollars. The nominal values X and Y (the bend points) are announced each year by the Social
take the United States until the middle of the next century to achieve the
current Japanese life expectancy. The other assumption is real wage
growth. Here the actuaries assume a growth rate that is over twice that
observed, on average, over the past quarter century.
Under more pessimistic but arguably more realistic assumptions, an im-
mediate and permanent payroll tax hike of more than 6 percentage points
and close to 50 percent is needed to ensure that the present value of all
future OASDI taxes plus the combined OASDI trust funds equal the pres-
entv alue of all future OASDI beneﬁts. If such a tax hike is not enacted in
the short term, even larger tax hikes will be required in the long term.
Alternatively, Social Security beneﬁts will have to be dramatically re-
duced.
6.5.2 Alternative OASI Reforms
All of the reforms we examine are based on the assumption that Social
Security continues to ﬁnance its beneﬁts on a PAYGO basis. The ﬁrst two
of the ten policies considered here were also examined in Caldwell et al.
(1999). These are an immediate and permanent 38 percent increase in the
OASI payroll tax rate and an immediate and permanent 25 percent cut in
all OASDI beneﬁts. The beneﬁt cut policy generates roughly the same
amount of saving inp r esent value as the tax hike and suﬃcest oeliminate
Social Security’s long-term ﬁscal imbalance when measured in present
value. Our third policy is entitled “Accelerated Increase in the NRA.” This
policy raises the normal retirement age (NRA) by six months pery e a r
after the year 2000 until the normal retirement age is raised to seventy by
the year 2010.13 Thef o urth policy uses the consumer price index (CPI)
rather than the OASI nominal wage index, to index average monthly cov-
ered earnings in forming recipients’ Average Indexed Monthly Earnings
(AIME).UnliketheOASInominalwageindex,whichreﬂectsbothinﬂation
and improvements in labor productivity, the CPI reﬂects only inﬂation.
Hence, in placing past earnings on an equal footing with current earnings,
CPIindexingprovidesacreditagainstinﬂationduringtheinterimyears, but
none for productivity growth. Because productivity growth is generally
positive, this method reduces progressively the contribution of earnings
that accrued earlier during a worker’s lifetime and results in a lower
AIME. A lower AIME, in turn, yields a lower PIA—the retirement beneﬁt
that the worker would receive if he or she begins to collect at the applicable
NRA. Note that this policy does not alter the scheduled growth in the
bend points used in calculating workers’ PIAs from their AIMEs.14
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lagged by two years. For example, the bend points for 1999 are obtained by multiplying the
corresponding 1979 bend point amounts by the ratio between the national average wage
index for 1997 ($27,426.00) and that for 1977 ($9,779.44). These results are then rounded to
the nearest dollar.
Our ﬁfth policy maintains the current formula for calculating initial ben-
eﬁts, but once these beneﬁts commence, they increase over time, not by
the CPI, but by the CPI minus 1 percent. The sixth policy is called “Stabi-
lize Real Per Capita Beneﬁts.” This policy calculates retirees’ primary in-
surance amounts as prescribed by current law, but then reduces these
amounts by post–year-2000 growth in labor productivity. This growth re-
duction factor means that real OASI beneﬁt levels do not keep pace with
economy-wide increases in labor productivity and real wages. The seventh
policy maintains the current beneﬁt formula in all respects except one: It
grows the bend points used in the calculating PIAs according to inﬂation
rather than the growth in the OASI wage index. Consequently, as real
wages grow, successive generations of retirees will ﬁnd themselves experi-
encing real “bracket creep,” meaning that the beneﬁts of an ever larger
percentage of retirees will be computed using the less progressive parts of
the beneﬁt formula.
Thee ighthp olicy eliminates the ceiling on taxable earnings but does not
alter the method of determining beneﬁts, so earnings that are above what
would otherwise be the ceiling will be included by OASI in the calculation
of beneﬁts. The ninth policy is equivalent to the previous one except for
this last feature: It collects taxes without any earnings ceiling but calcu-
lates beneﬁts based on the existing earnings ceiling provisions that apply
to the future as well as the present. The tenth and ﬁnal policy increases
the years used in computing covered workers’ AIME from thirty-ﬁve to
forty years.
6.5.3 Impact of the Alternative Policies on OASI’s
Unfunded Liability to Postwar Americans
As mentioned, policies 1 and 2 (the 38 percent immediate and perma-
nent hike in the OASDI tax rate and the 25 percent immediate and perma-
nent beneﬁt cut) both suﬃce,u n der the Social Security actuaries’ inter-
mediate assumptions, to bring the system’s ﬁnances into present value
balance when its future net cash ﬂows are discounted at a 3 percent real
rate of return. Both policies generate approximately $8 trillion more in net
taxes when measured in present value. These additional net taxes would
be paid not only by postwar Americans but also by other Americans either
alive now or expected to be born in the future.
Table 6.7 shows how these two policies as well as our other eight would
aﬀect the net taxes (taxes minus beneﬁts) that postwar Americans will pay,
measured in present value. The ﬁrst row of this table indicates that, under
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taxes by about $1.2 trillion; thus, the present value of postwar Americans’
future net taxes is negative. This is hardly surprising, given that the baby
boom generation is nearing retirement.
Although OASI’s $1.2 trillion unfunded net OASI liability to postwar
Americans is large, it represents less than 15 percent of the total $8.1 tril-
lion present value budget gap identiﬁed above. Thus, the overwhelming
majority of OASI’s present value imbalance consists not of obligations to
postwar Americans but of obligations to the Americans born before
1945—most of whom are now retired.
As table 6.7 indicates, all ten of the policies reduce the system’s liability
to postwar Americans. Indeed, eight of the ten policies wipe out the liabil-
itye ntirely; of these, six transform postwar Americans’ net tax payments
into a major implicit asset of the system by making their future beneﬁts
far smaller in present value than their future taxes. Take policy 1, the 38
percent tax hike. This policy reduces the unfunded net OASI liability to
postwar Americans by over $4 trillion! To put it more directly, this policy
forces postwar Americans to resolve, on their own, almost 50 percent of
the system’s current long-term ﬁscal imbalance. The same can be said of
policies 2, 6, and 9.
6.5.4 Lifetime Net Tax Rates Under Alternative Policies
Tables 6.8 through 6.10 show the impact on lifetime net tax rates of our
ten diﬀerent methods of dealing with OASI’s long-term funding shortfall.
These tables present results for all members of cohorts 45, 70, and 95,
cross-classiﬁed by lowest, middle, and highest quintiles of lifetime earn-
ings. They also consider three diﬀerent real discount rates—our bench-
Table 6.7 Change in Social Security’s Net Liability to Postwar Generations
Present Value Change from
Policy Imbalance Current Rules
Current rules 1,172.9
1 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 2,874.0 4,046.9
2 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 2,004.3 3,177.2
3A ccelerated increase in NRA 1,089.7 2,262.5
4 CPI indexing of covered earnings 145.9 1,026.9
5I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 231.0 1,403.9
6 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 3,312.7 4,485.6
7F reeze bend points in real terms 194.9 1,367.7
8 Eliminate taxable earnings ceiling 1,048.5 2,221.4
9 Eliminate taxable ceiling without beneﬁt 2,276.7 3,449.6
change
10 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 737.9 435.0
Source: Author’s calculations.
Social Security’s Treatment of Postwar Americans 235Table 6.8 The Impact of Potential OASI Reforms on Lifetime Net Tax Rates,
All Observations (r  5%)
Quintile of Average Beneﬁts
Lowest Middle Highest All
Birth cohort 1945–49
1 Current rules 4.2 6.1 5.0 5.3
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 3.9 6.4 5.3 5.7
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 0.2 7.1 5.4 6.0
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 1.7 6.9 5.4 5.9
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 3.0 6.4 5.1 5.6
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 2.5 6.5 5.1 5.6
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 2.3 6.6 5.2 5.7
8F reeze bend points in real terms 3.8 6.3 5.0 5.4
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 4.4 6.1 5.3 5.5
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 4.2 6.1 5.4 5.6
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 3.5 6.3 5.0 5.4
Birth cohort 1970–74
1 Current rules 3.4 5.7 5.3 5.4
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 1.1 8.4 7.1 7.6
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 0.0 6.9 5.7 6.1
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 1.6 6.5 5.6 5.9
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 2.2 6.1 5.4 5.6
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 1.9 6.2 5.4 5.7
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 1.9 7.5 5.9 6.5
8F reeze bend points in real terms 2.2 6.3 5.5 5.8
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 4.1 5.7 7.7 6.9
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 3.4 5.7 8.2 7.3
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 2.6 5.9 5.3 5.5
Birth cohort 1995–2000
1 Current rules 2.9 5.5 5.4 5.4
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 0.9 9.3 8.0 8.4
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 0.4 6.7 5.8 6.1
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 1.3 6.2 5.6 5.8
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 1.7 5.9 5.5 5.6
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 1.5 5.9 5.5 5.6
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 6.8 9.0 6.6 7.5
8F reeze bend points in real terms 0.9 6.4 5.7 5.9
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 3.3 5.5 8.2 7.1
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 2.9 5.5 8.7 7.5
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 2.2 5.7 5.4 5.5
Source: Author’s calculations.Table 6.9 The Impact of Potential OASI Reforms on Lifetime Net Tax Rates,
All Observations (r  7%)
Quintile of Average Beneﬁts
Lowest Middle Highest All
Birth cohort 1945–49
1 Current rules 4.7 8.4 5.9 6.9
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 5.0 8.6 6.1 7.1
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 6.5 8.9 6.0 7.2
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 5.9 8.8 6.0 7.2
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 5.2 8.6 5.9 7.0
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 5.4 8.6 5.9 7.0
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 5.6 8.7 5.9 7.0
8F reeze bend points in real terms 4.9 8.5 5.9 6.9
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 4.6 8.4 6.1 7.0
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 4.7 8.4 6.1 7.0
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 5.0 8.5 5.9 6.9
Birth cohort 1970–74
1 Current rules 3.4 8.1 6.2 6.9
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 5.6 10.5 7.9 8.8
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 5.1 8.7 6.4 7.2
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 4.3 8.5 6.3 7.1
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 4.0 8.3 6.2 7.0
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 4.1 8.3 6.3 7.0
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 6.1 9.0 6.5 7.4
8F reeze bend points in real terms 4.0 8.4 6.3 7.0
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 3.1 8.1 8.6 8.4
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 3.4 8.1 8.8 8.5
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 3.8 8.2 6.2 6.9
Birth cohort 1995–2000
1 Current rules 3.7 7.8 6.3 6.9
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 7.5 11.7 9.0 10.0
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 5.3 8.4 6.5 7.2
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 4.5 8.2 6.4 7.1
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 4.3 8.0 6.4 7.0
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 4.3 8.0 6.4 7.0
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 8.5 9.6 6.9 7.9
8F reeze bend points in real terms 4.7 8.3 6.5 7.2
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 3.5 7.8 9.2 8.7
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 3.7 7.9 9.5 8.8
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 4.1 7.9 6.3 6.9
Source: Author’s calculations.Table 6.10 The Impact of Potential OASI Reforms on Lifetime Net Tax Rates,
All Observations (r  3%)
Quintile of Average Beneﬁts
Lowest Middle Highest All
Birth cohort 1945–49
1 Current rules 23.0 1.9 3.3 2.5
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 22.5 2.4 3.8 3.0
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 14.3 3.9 4.1 3.9
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 17.8 3.5 4.1 3.6
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 20.3 2.5 3.5 2.9
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 18.8 2.7 3.7 3.1
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 18.9 2.8 3.7 3.1
8F reeze bend points in real terms 21.9 2.1 3.5 2.7
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 23.4 1.9 3.7 2.7
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 23.0 1.9 4.0 2.9
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 21.4 2.2 3.4 2.7
Birth cohort 1970–74
1 Current rules 17.9 0.9 3.7 2.7
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 15.5 3.9 5.6 5.0
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 10.8 3.3 4.4 4.0
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 14.4 2.5 4.2 3.5
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 15.3 1.7 3.9 3.1
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 14.4 2.0 4.0 3.3
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 7.0 4.7 4.8 4.7
8F reeze bend points in real terms 15.4 2.0 4.1 3.3
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 19.4 0.8 5.9 4.0
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 17.9 0.9 6.8 4.7
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 16.3 1.3 3.7 2.8
Birth cohort 1995–2000
1 Current rules 17.4 0.8 3.7 2.5
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 13.5 4.6 6.3 5.5
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 10.5 3.2 4.5 3.9
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 14.0 2.1 4.2 3.4
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 14.8 1.5 3.9 3.0
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 14.1 1.7 4.0 3.1
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 3.1 7.9 6.0 6.6
8F reeze bend points in real terms 13.1 2.5 4.4 3.6
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 18.3 0.7 6.2 4.1
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 17.4 0.8 7.2 4.7
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 15.9 1.1 3.8 2.7
Source: Author’s calculations.15. This percentage point increase precisely equals that required for eliminating the
OASI imbalance.
16. Under current rules, the NRA is scheduled to increase from sixty-ﬁve for those who
will achieve age sixty-ﬁve in 2002 or earlier to sixty-six for those who will achieve age sixty-
ﬁve between the years 2007 and 2019. Thereafter, the NRA will increase from sixty-six for
those achieving age sixty-ﬁve before the year 2020 to sixty-seven for those achieving age sixty-
ﬁve in 2025.
mark rate of 5 percent, a high rate of 7 percent, and a low rate of 3 percent.
Theg roupo f3 2t ables which supplement this paper, which are posted at
[http://www.NBER.org/data-appendix/gokhale01] results broken down by
demographic subgroup.
Observe ﬁrst the 5 percent discount rate results for policies 1 and 2 in
table 6.8. Implementing either policy would raise the lifetime net tax rates
of all postwar generations. However, the two policies have quite diﬀerent
intergenerational incidence. The tax hike hits later generations much
harder than it does earlier ones. The beneﬁt cut aﬀects all generations
roughly the same. Consider cohorts 45 and 96. The tax hike policy raises
cohort 45’s lifetime net tax rate from 5.3 percent to just 5.7 percent, but it
raises cohort 95’s lifetime net tax rate from 5.4 to 8.4 percent. In contrast,
the beneﬁt cut policy leaves cohort 45’s and 95’s lifetime net tax rates at
6.0 percent and 6.1 percent, respectively. Clearly, earlier generations fare
better under the tax hike because they have limited remaining labor earn-
ings that are subject to the higher payroll tax rate. In the case of the bene-
ﬁt cut, all generations are similarly hurt because none has yet begun to
receive Social Security retirement beneﬁts, which is the lion’s share of
OASI beneﬁts.
Both of these policies are tougher on the lifetime low earners than on
the lifetime high earners in terms of their impact on lifetime net tax rates.
For those in the lowest quintile in cohort 95, a 38 percent tax hike means
losing close to four cents more per dollar earned to the system.15 For their
contemporaries in the highest quintile, the policy means losing only 2.6
percent more per dollar earned. Under the beneﬁt cut policy, these diﬀer-
encesa re much more striking. The poorest one-ﬁfth of cohort 95 lose 3.3
percent of their lifetime incomes, whereas the richest ﬁfth lose only 0.4
percent. Finally, it is worth noting that for the bottom quintile in cohort
95 both the tax hike and beneﬁt cut policies transform OASI from a net
subsidy into a net tax.
How do policies 3 through 10 compare with policies 1 and 2? In terms
of their impact on lifetime net tax rates, the answer is that they fall between
policies 1 and 2. Several points are, however, worth stressing. First, policy
3 (the accelerated increase in NRA) hurts older cohorts more than younger
cohorts. For example, the overall increase in the lifetime net tax rate for
cohort 45 is 0.6, whereas it is only 0.4 for cohort 95. This occurs because
current rules already incorporate an increase in the NRA.16 The accelera-
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particularly hard. For example, those reaching age sixty-ﬁve in the year
2010 would have a normal retirement age of sixty-six under current rules,
buts eventyu n der policy 3. In contrast, the NRA of those reaching age
sixty-ﬁve after 2022 will increase from sixty-seven under current rules to
seventy under policy 3.
Second, policies 6, 7, 8, and 9 (“Stabilize Real Per Capita Beneﬁts,”
“Eliminate Earnings Ceiling,” and “Eliminate Earnings Ceiling without
Beneﬁt Change”) hurt younger cohorts much more than older ones. Policy
6 eliminates the real growth in beneﬁts under the current system associated
with economy-wide productivity growth. Hence, later retiring generations,
whose beneﬁts would otherwise be higher than the beneﬁts of those retir-
ing earlier, lose the most from this policy. As mentioned earlier, policy 7
imposes bracket creep: Slower growth in nominal bend point values ex-
poses a greater fraction of each person’s AIME to the relatively progres-
sive regions of the PIA formula. Under policy 8, the incremental lifetime
earnings subject to payroll taxes are much larger for younger than for older
generations because a greater fraction of the former generations’ working
lifetimes lies the future. However, because of the progressive beneﬁt for-
mula, younger generations’ beneﬁts do not keep pace with the increase in
their lifetime payroll taxes. The eﬀect ise v e nm o r ep r o n o unced when bene-
ﬁtsa re held constant under policy 9.
Third, policy 6 (and, to a lesser extent, policy 7) is extremely tough on
poor members of young cohorts. For the bottom quintile of cohort 95,
policy 6 transforms OASI’s 2.9 percent of lifetime earnings net subsidy
into a 6.8 percent net tax and leaves this quintile with a higher net tax rate
than the top quintile! Note that this policy has a much bigger impact than
does policy 4 (“CPI Indexing of Covered Earnings”) on the lifetime net
tax rates of poor members of young cohorts. The same can be said of
middle- and upper-income young cohort members. The reason is that pol-
icy6directly eliminates all growth in beneﬁts due to overall real wage
growth, whereas policy 4 works by reducing the AIME. For those at the
upper range of the distribution of lifetime earnings, a 1 percent reduction
in the AIME translates into only a 0.15 percent reduction in beneﬁts under
policy 4. Policy 7 (“Freeze Bend Points in Real Terms”) is particularly
damaging to the lifetime poor because it pushes them into lower marginal
beneﬁt brackets.
Fourth, policy 9—raising the earnings ceiling without concomitant ben-
eﬁt increases (without permitting the higher covered earnings to be in-
cluded in the calculation of AIME)—is particularly grievous on young
cohort members in the highest lifetime earnings quintile. As can be veriﬁed
in the bottom panel of table 6.8, policy 9 raises the lifetime net tax rate of
cohort 95’s top 20 percent of lifetime earners by 3.3 percentage points. In
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lifetime net tax rate. The explanation is that many of the observations in these quintiles
receive beneﬁts based on their spouses’ earnings record and these beneﬁts go up when all of
their spouses’ earnings are included in the calculation of dependent and survivor beneﬁts,
not simply their spouses’ earnings up to the covered earnings ceiling.
contrast, the poorest members of this cohort experience no change in their
lifetime net tax rates.17
Fifth, policy 10 (“Increase Computation Years from 35 to 40) leaves
unchanged the lifetime net tax rates of the top earning quintiles, whereas
it raises those of the lowest and middle quintiles. The lowest quintile in
each cohort is especially hard hit. The reason is that members of this
quintile have many years in their earnings histories during which they do
not work. Including those years in calculating AIME lowers their AIMEs
and, thus, their beneﬁt levels.
6.5.5 The Sensitivity of the Results to the Choice of Discount Rates
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 repeat the analysis of table 6.8 but assume discount
rates of 3 and 7 percent, respectively. Comparing the same policy across
the three tables indicates that the level of lifetime net tax rates is highly
sensitive to the choice of discount rates. For example, under current law
and assuming a 3 percent discount rate, the lifetime net tax rate of the
lowest lifetime earnings quintile in cohort 70 is 17.9 percent. Assuming
a5p e r c e n tdiscount rate, it is 3.4 percent, and assuminga7p e r c e n tdis-
count rate, it is 3.4 percent. Hence, a 400 basis point swing in the choice
of the discount rate transforms the OASI system from a huge net subsidy
to the poor to a small net tax. The same experiment—moving from a 3
percentt oa7p e r c e n td i s c o u n tr a t e — r a i s e st h ecurrent-rules lifetime net
tax rate of the middle quintile from 0.8 percent to 7.8 percent, a very
dramatic increase.
In contrast, for the highest quintile in cohort 70, the absolute increase
in the lifetime net tax rate (in moving from a 3 to a 7 percent discount
rate) is only 2.5 percentage points. One reason for this diﬀerence is that
the lifetime poor have shorter workspans. This makes the denominators of
the lifetime net tax rates of the poor less sensitive to the discount rate than
the numerators, which makes the net tax rate itself more sensitive. A sec-
ond reasoni sthat the lifetime poor are paying relatively little in OASI
taxes compared to the beneﬁts they receive. This means that changes in
the discount rate change the present value of beneﬁts by substantially more
than they do the present value of taxes. This point becomes abundantly
clear when one considers the case in which taxes equal beneﬁts on an
annual basis. In this case, the lifetime net tax rate is zero regardless of the
discount rate.
Given the substantial sensitivity of the calculated lifetime OASI net tax
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rate is most appropriate to use in this context. The answer depends on
one’s view of the risk of OASI taxes and transfers. If one views these ﬂows
as no more risky than, say, the repayment of government debt, the appro-
priate discount rate would be the real return oﬀered by inﬂation-indexed
treasury bonds. If, on the other hand, these ﬂows are not only risky but
subject to ﬂuctuations in line with the stock market, then the expected
return on the stock market would be the appropriate benchmark. In the
former case, a real discount rate of between 3 and 4 percent would be
justiﬁed. In the latter case, a rate around 7 percent should be chosen.
As Baxter and King (2001) pointed out, the method of wage-indexing
Social Security beneﬁts and the positive correlation between real wage
growth and the stock market, suggests that both Social Security taxes and
beneﬁts move with the stock market. On the other hand, there are ample
examples of changes in Social Security beneﬁt rules that have not coin-
cided with stock market ﬂuctuations. How these political risks would af-
fect the appropriate rate at which to discount Social Security beneﬁts is a
subject we are currently researching.
6.5.6 Lifetime Net Tax Rates of Demographic Groups
Under Alternative Policies
The male and female results, based on the benchmark 5 percent dis-
count rate, are displayed in website tables 1 and 2. These tables show the
same general patterns across policy alternatives as table 6.8. Males and
females would generally rank the policy alternatives in the same way, pro-
vided they were in the same earnings quintile within the same cohort. As
an example, take cohort 95. For middle-income males in this group, the
tax hike policy produces the highest net tax rate—9.8 percent. For the
bottom quintile males, policy 6 (“Stabilize Real Per Capital Beneﬁts”) is
the worst, leaving this group facing a 7.9 percent lifetime net tax rate—a
full 1.3 percentage points higher than the corresponding rate facing those
in the top quintile of this cohort. Moreover, for the top quintile of males,
eliminating the earnings ceiling with no beneﬁt change is the worst alterna-
tive, producing an 8.7 percent lifetime net tax rate. Middle quintile and
bottom quintile females are both harmed the most by policy 6, but in the
case of middle quintile females, the tax hike policy is almost as bad; and,
like the top quintile males, the top quintile females ﬁnd policy 9 the
worst overall.
Whites and nonwhites within the same cohort and quintile would also
rank the policy changes the same. This is also the case for the college-
educated and non–college educated. As web site tables 3 through 6 con-
ﬁrm, the really adverse policies for cohort 45 members, regardless of their
race or education, are policy 2 and policy 1. For those in the middle
quintile of cohort 95, policies 1 and 6 are the worst policies, independent
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quintile, it is clear that certain policies that are worse for the high earners
areb etter for nonwhites than whites, and for the non–college educated
than for the college-educated, because the former groups are overrepre-
sented in the lower quintiles. Policy 9 is an example. For cohort 95, this
policy would lower the nonwhite/white and non–college educated/college-
educated lifetime net tax rate diﬀerentials from 0.7 to 0.1 and from 0.8 to
0.5 percent, respectively.
Web sitet a b l e s7a n d8s h o wthe impact of the proposed reforms on
college-educated, white males, on the one hand, and non–college edu-
cated, nonwhite females on the other. Again, how individual members of
these groups fare is primarily a matter of their cohort, their quintile, and
the policy selected. However, if one fails to consider quintile position, poli-
cies8a n d9a re particularly detrimental to white, college-educated males
relative to nonwhite, non–college educated females.
6.5.7 Internal Rates of Return Under Alternative Policies
Table 6.11 considers how the ten policies alter internal rates of return.
With the exception of the beneﬁt cut and accelerated increase in NRA
policies, the reforms produce rather small changes in overall internal rates
of return for cohort 45. For cohort 95, however, the story is quite diﬀerent.
Sixofthetenpoliciesreducetheoverallinternalrateofreturnby0.5ormore
percentage points. Policy 6, which stabilizes real beneﬁts, produces a nega-
tive 2.3 percent rate of return. This is to be expected, given that the policy
cuts initial beneﬁts based on a compound productivity growth factor.
Higher earners in all three cohorts experience the sharpest reductions
in internal rates of return. In cohort 95, four of the ten policies reduce the
internal rates of return of those in the top quintile by 0.9 percentage points
or more.P olicy6l owers the internal rate of return of those in the top
quintile in cohort 95 from 0.6 percent to 3.8 percent! Of the ten policies,
eight leave top quintile earners in cohort 95 with negative to very close to
zero rates of return.
While all ten policies substantially lower rates of return earned by the
lifetime high earners, only policy 6 dramatically reduces the rate of return
earned by the lifetime poor, and only in the case of cohort 95. Take, as an
example, the tax hike policy. For the bottom quintile in cohort 95, the
internal rate of return declines from 5.7 percent to 4.8 percent. Although
this may seem small, its also consistent with table 6.7’s ﬁnding that the
policy raises this group’s lifetime net tax rate by 3.8 percentage points—
notasmall amount. The point that must be kept in mind, then, is the
standard one about the power of compound interest; in this context, it
means that small diﬀerences in internal rates of return can translate into
very large diﬀerences in lifetime net tax rates.
As expected, policy 9 (eliminating the earnings ceiling without changing
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All Observations
Lowest Middle Highest All
Birth Cohort 1945–49
0 Current rules 5.7 2.4 0.8 1.9
1 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 5.7 2.3 0.5 1.7
2 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 5.0 1.6 0.1 1.1
3A ccelerated increase in NRA 5.3 1.8 0 1.3
4 CPI indexing of covered earnings 5.5 2.2 0.6 1.7
5I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 5.5 2.1 0.4 1.6
6 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 5.4 2.1 0.4 1.6
7F reeze bend points in real terms 5.7 2.3 0.7 1.8
8 Eliminate earnings ceiling 5.8 2.4 0.6 1.9
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 5.7 2.4 0.4 1.8
change
10 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 5.6 2.3 0.7 1.8
Birth Cohort 1970–74
0 Current rules 5.8 2.8 0.6 1.8
1 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 5.2 2.0 0.2 1.1
2 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 5.0 1.9 0.2 1.0
3A ccelerated increase in NRA 5.4 2.3 0.1 1.3
4 CPI indexing of covered earnings 5.5 2.5 0.4 1.6
5I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 5.5 2.4 0.2 1.5
6 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 4.5 1.4 0.9 0.4
7F reeze bend points in real terms 5.5 2.4 0.2 1.5
8 Eliminate earnings ceiling 5.9 2.8 0.2 1.5
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 5.8 2.8 0.7 1.1
change
10 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 5.6 2.7 0.6 1.7
Birth cohort 1995–2000
0 Current rules 5.7 2.8 0.6 1.9
1 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 4.8 1.9 0.4 0.9
2 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 4.9 2.0 0.3 1.0
3A ccelerated increase in NRA 5.3 2.3 0.1 1.4
4 CPI indexing of covered earnings 5.4 2.6 0.4 1.7
5I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 5.4 2.5 0.2 1.5
6 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 2.0 1.3 3.8 2.3
7F reeze bend points in real terms 5.2 2.2 0.1 1.2
8 Eliminate earnings ceiling 5.8 2.8 0.1 1.5
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 5.7 2.8 0.8 1.1
change
10 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 5.5 2.7 0.5 1.8
Source: Author’s calculations.beneﬁts) signiﬁcantly reduces the internal rates of return for those in the
highest quintile, especially for later-born cohorts. The patterns shown in
table 6.11 are reproduced to varying degrees in web site tables 9 through
16, which break down the policy eﬀects on internal rates of return by dem-
ographic subgroup. Policy 3 (the accelerated increase in NRA) aﬀects
older men more than older women, but the same is not true for younger
men versus younger women. For example, the internal rate of return (not
controlling for quintile) falls by 0.9 percentage points for men but only by
0.5 percentage points for women in cohort 45. In contrast, the correspond-
ing changes are 0.6 percentage points for men and 0.5 percentage points
forw omen in cohort 95. This result may arise because the longevity diﬀer-
ence between men and women is greater for cohort 45 than for cohort 95.
As a result, postponing the NRA aﬀects men more than women in the
older cohort, but this eﬀecti sn ot as pronounced for younger men versus
women. Web site tables 9 through 16 reveal no other signiﬁcant diﬀerences
across demographic groups with respect to the manner in which internal
rates of return respond to particular policy changes.
6.5.8 Implicit Wealth Tax Rates Under Alternative Policies
Table 6.12 shows how OASI implicit wealth taxes, calculated at a 5 per-
cent discount rate, would be altered by the ten policies. Each policy would
raise implicit tax rates for all postwar cohorts, but for the oldest cohorts
the eﬀects would be small. In the case of cohort 45, the current rules im-
plicit tax rate is 66.3 percent. Policy 2 (the explicit beneﬁt cut) produces
the largest increase in this tax rate, but the increase is only to 74.8 percent.
Forc ohort 95, the implicit tax rate under current law is 65.8 percent. Policy
6g e nerates the greatest increase in this tax rate, to 91.5 percent; policy 2
generates the second greatest increase, to 75.2 percent.
The increases in implicit wealth tax rates are more dramatic for the bot-
tom quintile of cohort 95. This quintile faces a negative current rules tax
rate equal to 28.9 percent, meaning the government is returning in bene-
ﬁts 1.289 cents per dollar paid in taxes. Policies 1, 2, and 6 reverse the sign
of this group’s implicit tax rate. Indeed, policy 6 raises the tax rate all the
wayt o67.1 percent. For the top quintile in cohort 95, six of the policies
generate implicit wealth tax rates in excess of 80 percent; policy 6 imposes
an implicit tax rate of 94.4 percent. Web site tables 17 through 24 provide
demographic breakdowns of these results. As in the case of lifetime net
tax rates and internal rates of return, the basic patterns of policy impacts
experienced by the overall samples in each cohort carry over to the demo-
graphic subgroups.
Tables 6.13 and 6.14 consider how the implicit wealth tax rates would
diﬀer when calculated based on either a 3 percent ora7p e r c e n tr e a l
discount rate. The answer is that they would diﬀer enormously. Under cur-
rent rules, the lowest quintile of cohort 70 faces a negative 175 percent
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All Observations (r  5%)
Quintile of Average Beneﬁts
Lowest Middle Highest All
Birth cohort 1945–49
1 Current rules 35.3 61.5 75.6 66.3
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 31.6 62.7 76.7 67.6
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 1.5 71.4 81.7 74.8
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 14.1 69.4 81.6 73.6
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 24.8 64.6 77.1 68.8
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 20.9 65.3 77.9 69.6
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 19.4 66.1 78.5 70.3
8F reeze bend points in real terms 31.3 62.8 76.7 67.5
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 37.1 61.3 75.3 66.3
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 35.3 61.5 77.1 67.3
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 29.0 63.0 76.3 67.5
Birth cohort 1970–74
1 Current rules 33.7 55.6 78.2 67.5
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 8.8 64.8 82.8 74.3
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 0.1 67.0 83.7 75.8
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 16.0 63.1 82.2 73.1
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 21.6 59.4 79.6 70.2
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 18.9 60.1 80.4 70.9
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 18.3 73.3 86.8 80.4
8F reeze bend points in real terms 21.9 60.9 81.2 71.6
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 39.8 55.1 79.7 70.1
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 33.6 55.7 84.7 73.6
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 25.9 57.3 78.6 68.7
Birth cohort 1995–2000
1 Current rules 28.9 53.8 77.5 65.8
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 6.5 66.5 83.7 75.2
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 3.6 65.7 83.1 74.5
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 12.5 60.8 81.1 71.1
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 16.6 57.7 78.9 68.6
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 15.2 58.1 79.7 69.2
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 67.1 88.8 94.4 91.5
8F reeze bend points in real terms 8.8 62.6 82.4 72.9
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 32.7 53.6 79.9 69.5
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 28.8 53.9 84.8 72.8
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 21.5 55.6 77.9 67.0
Source: Author’s calculations.Table 6.13 The Impact of Potential OASI Reforms on Implicit Wealth Tax Rates,
All Observations (r  7%)
Quintile of Average Beneﬁts
Lowest Middle Highest All
Birth cohort 1945–49
1 Current rules 38.7 82.2 88.2 83.8
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 40.1 82.6 88.5 84.2
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 53.8 86.8 91.2 87.9
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 49.2 86.0 91.1 87.4
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 43.4 83.7 88.9 85.0
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 44.5 83.8 89.2 85.2
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 45.9 84.4 89.6 85.7
8F reeze bend points in real terms 40.5 82.8 88.7 84.4
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 38.0 82.2 87.8 83.6
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 38.7 82.2 88.7 84.1
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 41.7 82.9 88.5 84.4
Birth cohort 1970–74
1 Current rules 33.5 78.6 89.4 84.2
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 45.2 82.7 91.5 87.3
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 50.2 84.1 92.1 88.2
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 42.6 82.3 91.4 87.0
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 39.3 80.4 90.1 85.5
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 40.0 80.6 90.4 85.7
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 59.4 87.2 93.6 90.5
8F reeze bend points in real terms 39.3 81.2 90.9 86.2
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 30.7 78.3 89.8 85.2
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 33.5 78.7 92.3 86.9
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 37.7 79.4 89.7 84.8
Birth cohort 1995–2000
1 Current rules 36.4 77.1 89.0 83.2
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 53.9 83.4 92.0 87.8
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 52.4 83.1 91.8 87.5
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 44.7 80.6 90.8 85.8
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 42.3 79.1 89.7 84.6
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 42.5 79.1 90.0 84.7
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 83.8 94.5 97.3 95.9
8F reeze bend points in real terms 46.3 81.5 91.4 86.7
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 34.5 77.0 89.9 84.8
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 36.4 77.2 92.4 86.4
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 40.2 78.1 89.2 83.8
Source: Author’s calculations.Table 6.14 The Impact of Potential OASI Reforms on Implicit Wealth Tax Rates,
All Observations (r  3%)
Quintile of Average Beneﬁts
Lowest Middle Highest All
Birth cohort 1945–49
1 Current rules 196.1 19.2 50.9 30.9
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 185.0 22.9 54.2 34.9
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 121.8 39.9 63.3 48.4
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 152.3 35.3 62.8 45.6
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 173.0 25.7 53.8 36.1
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 160.6 28.0 56.1 38.4
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 161.2 28.8 56.7 39.1
8F reeze bend points in real terms 187.3 21.9 53.1 33.4
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 200.2 18.9 51.9 32.0
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 196.1 19.3 55.5 34.1
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 182.6 22.3 52.3 33.5
Birth cohort 1970–74
1 Current rules 175.0 8.9 55.6 33.7
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 122.1 29.1 65.7 48.6
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 105.9 32.1 66.8 50.5
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 140.8 23.8 63.5 44.7
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 149.4 16.5 58.4 39.1
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 140.5 19.1 60.6 41.2
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 68.2 45.1 73.1 59.8
8F reeze bend points in real terms 150.8 19.6 61.7 42.0
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 189.6 7.9 60.1 40.3
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 175.0 9.0 70.0 47.3
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 159.4 12.3 56.5 36.0
Birth cohort 1995–2000
1 Current rules 170.9 7.5 54.7 31.4
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 96.4 32.9 67.2 50.2
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 102.8 31.1 66.1 48.8
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 137.6 21.1 62.1 41.9
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 145.2 15.1 57.5 36.9
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 138.8 17.0 59.6 38.7
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 30.5 77.4 88.7 83.0
8F reeze bend points in real terms 128.8 24.9 64.6 45.6
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 179.5 6.8 60.5 39.7
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 170.7 7.8 70.1 46.3
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 155.9 11.1 55.6 33.7
Source: Author’s calculations.implicit tax rate when the discount rate is 3 percent, and a 33.5 percent im-
plicit tax rate when the discount rate is 7 percent. For middle quintile mem-
bersofcohort70,seventy-sevencentsofeverydollarcontributedtoOASIis
a tax if one accepts a 7 percent discount rate; only nine cents of every
dollar is a tax if one does the calculation witha3p e r c e n td i s c o u n tr a t e .
6.5.9 Beneﬁt Reductions of Retirees by Quintiles
of Average Social Security Beneﬁts
Our ﬁnal set of tables, table 6.15 and web site tables 25 through 32,
shows how the various policies alter the average OASI beneﬁts received
by a subset of observations in cohorts 45, 70, and 90—namely, those who
receive beneﬁts for at least one year after reaching age sixty-two. In these
tables, rather than classify observations within the three cohorts on the
basiso flifetime earnings quintiles, we sort the observations based on
quintiles of average OASI beneﬁts received after reaching age sixty-two.
Before sorting the observations, we calculate for each observation the aver-
agea mount of beneﬁts received (in 1998 dollars) over only the years in
which the observation is age sixty-two or older and actually receives bene-
ﬁts. Since roughly 40 percent of retired American households appear to
be living almost exclusively from Social Security beneﬁts, the lowest
quintile of Social Security beneﬁt recipients represents individuals for
whom Social Security income is critically important.
Under current rules, average beneﬁts are generally higher in constant
1998 dollars for later retiring cohorts—reﬂecting the projected growth in
beneﬁts due to real wage growth. This statement is not true for those in
the lowest quintile of average beneﬁts, presumably because this cohort
(and others close to it) will bear the brunt of the increase in the NRA al-
readys cheduled to occur during the ﬁrst two decades of the next century.
Among the ten policies considered here, policies 1 and 9 do not aﬀect
OASI beneﬁts at all. Policy 2 generates precisely what it is supposed to: a
25 percent beneﬁt cut across all cohorts and quintiles. Policy 3 (the acceler-
ated increase in NRA) reduces beneﬁts by less than policy 2 across all
cohorts and quintiles. It hurts earlier born generations by more because,
given the increase in NRA already scheduled under current rules, policy
3e xposes these cohorts to a larger increase in NRA compared to later
born generations. Although in dollar terms policy 3 hurts those in the
highest quintiles the most, it reduces the beneﬁts of the beneﬁt-poor by
more in percentage terms. For cohort 95, for example, it reduces the aver-
age beneﬁt by $921 at the lowest quintile, a 19 percent reduction, and by
$3,338 at the highest quintile of average beneﬁts, a 12 percent reduction.
Policy 4 (CPI indexing of Covered Earnings) exhibits a similar pattern
across quintiles to that of policy 2. In percentage terms, it harms the
beneﬁt-poor by more than the beneﬁt-rich. In this case, however, the rea-
soni sthat a marginal reduction in the AIME of better-oﬀ individuals does
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Quintile of Average Beneﬁts
Lowest Middle Highest All
Birth cohort 1945–49
1 Current rules 3,814 8,612 17,203 9,614
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 3,814 8,612 17,203 9,614
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 2,863 6,518 12,968 7,267
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 2,871 6,881 13,695 7,620
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 3,450 7,883 16,243 8,931
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 3,438 7,680 15,401 8,589
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 3,374 7,644 15,241 8,532
8F reeze bend points in real terms 3,695 8,364 16,494 9,271
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 3,814 8,651 18,735 9,949
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 3,814 8,612 17,203 9,614
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 3,599 8,279 16,742 9,274
Birth cohort 1970–74
1 Current rules 3,757 9,313 20,305 10,757
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 3,757 9,313 20,305 10,757
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 2,830 7,054 15,264 8,108
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 3,048 7,781 17,203 9,008
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 3,284 8,505 19,112 9,928
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 3,363 8,239 18,013 9,537
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 2,287 5,760 12,415 6,601
8F reeze bend points in real terms 3,410 8,354 17,602 9,445
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 3,757 9,410 27,425 12,254
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 3,757 9,313 20,305 10,757
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 3,511 8,949 19,973 10,421
Birth cohort 1995–2000
1 Current rules 4,919 12,212 26,868 14,143
2 38% tax hike beginning in year 2000 4,919 12,212 26,868 14,143
3 25% beneﬁt cut beginning in year 2000 3,688 9,258 20,188 10,643
4A ccelerated increase in NRA 3,998 10,336 23,530 12,040
5 CPI indexing of covered earnings 4,317 11,172 25,204 13,049
6I n dexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1% 4,401 10,847 24,034 12,610
7 Stabilize real per capita beneﬁts 1,216 3,143 6,903 3,606
8F reeze bend points in real terms 4,078 10,108 21,246 11,275
9 Eliminate earnings ceiling 4,921 12,355 35,777 16,028
10 Eliminate earnings ceiling without beneﬁt 4,919 12,212 26,868 14,143
change
11 Increase computation years from 35 to 40 4,602 11,742 26,378 13,696
Source: Author’s calculations.nott r anslate into a proportional reduction in their beneﬁts because they
face lower marginal PIA rates. Policy 5 (Indexing beneﬁts by CPI minus 1
percent) yields the most uniform percentage reduction in average beneﬁts
across all cohorts and quintiles—about 11 percent. At 75 percent, policy
6 (Stabilizing Real Per Capita Beneﬁts) generates very large beneﬁt reduc-
tion for cohort 95. The reduction isas i z a b l e4 0p e r c e n tf or cohort 70 and
is only 11 percent for the oldest cohort. The percentage reductions for the
respective cohorts are uniform across quintiles.
As expected, policy 7 generates a larger percentage beneﬁt reduction for
the youngest cohort—about 20 percent overall. As mentioned earlier, this
occurs because the bracket-creep eﬀecti sm osts evere forl a ter born gener-
ations. Policy 8 leads to an increase in future beneﬁts for the middle and
highest quintiles of all cohorts, but this eﬀect is strongest in percentage
terms for members of the highest quintile of cohort 70. Their average an-
nual beneﬁt (conditional on receiving a beneﬁt) increases by more than
$7,000—an increase of 35 percent over that under current rules. Finally,
policy 10 (Increasing Computation Years from 35 to 40) leads to fairly
modest reductions in average beneﬁts across all cohorts and quintiles.
Tables 36 through 43 (located on the web site) report reductions in average
beneﬁts by demographic group; the beneﬁts reductions in these tables are
similar to those in table 35.
6.6 Summary and Conclusion
This paper uses CORSIM, a dynamic microsimulation model developed
by Steven Caldwell and his colleagues, and Economic Security Planner’s
detailed Social Security beneﬁt calculator to study how potential reform
of Social Security’s OASI program would aﬀect postwar Americans. We
consider ten alternative reforms, including a major and immediate increase
in the OASI tax rate, a major and immediate cut in beneﬁts, an accelerated
increase in the age of normal retirement, two alternative methods of mov-
ing from wage-indexed to price-index beneﬁts, and the elimination of the
ceiling on taxable payroll. We present results for diﬀerent postwar cohorts
and diﬀerent lifetime earnings groups within those cohorts and decompose
these results by sex, race, and education. We also demonstrate the sensitiv-
ityo fc ertain of our results to the choice of real discount rate.
Our measures of the impacts of reform are four: how the reforms alter
OASI lifetime net tax rates, internal rates of return, implicit wealth tax
rates, and average beneﬁt levels received by retirees. Regardless of which
measure we examine, the message of our paper is clear: Reforms to the
OASI system of the typen eeded to bring the system’s ﬁnances into present
value balance are likely to greatly worsen OASI’s treatment of postwar
Americans. Although sex, race, and education play a role in determining
current and prospective OASI treatment of postwar Americans, the pri-
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in the distribution of lifetime earnings.
They oungestp o stwar generations have the most to worry about in this
regard because tax increases will aﬀect them over their entire working
careers and beneﬁt cuts will be fully phased in when they retire. Under
current law, today’s newborns are slated to surrender ﬁve cents of every
dollar earned to the OASI system in taxes paid net of beneﬁts received.
That lifetime net tax rate could rise as high as 8 percent under some of the
reformsb eing contemplated by Social Security’s actuaries. For the poorest
members of today’s newborn generation, a number of the reforms would
transform the system from a net subsidy to a net tax. For the highest-
earning members of today’s newborn generations, some of the reforms
translate into large negative internal rates of return on contributions and
implicit wealth taxes of close to 100 percent.
To conclude, this paper assumes the OASI system will continue to run
on aP AYGO basis and considers alternative reforms to achieve ﬁnancial
solvency. Each is highly unpleasant. However, some reforms are more
even-handed than are others with respect to their distribution of addi-
tional ﬁscal burdens both across and within generations. Microsimulation
analysis of the kind presented herec an help policy makers better sugar-
coat what will inevitably be a bitter pill.
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Comment David A. Wise
Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence Kotlikoﬀ have written a very informa-
tive paper. I like it. The results of their analysis are very sobering, and
perhaps even suggest, as the authors put it, “how bad Social Security’s
treatment of postwar Americans would be under alternative tax increases
and beneﬁt cuts.” The most striking conclusion is that balancing the Social
Security budget would requirea4pe r ce n t a g epoint, or 38 percent, increase
in the OASI current 10.6 percent tax rate. The very high tax rates and low
internal rates of return posited for most participants, while perhaps not
new ideas, are also depressing. Finally, the diﬀerential eﬀect of potential
reforms on diﬀerent lifetime income groups should inform future discus-
sion of reform proposals.
The analysis is based on “synthetic” data, which at ﬁrst aroused my
suspicions, but the benchmark evidence that the authors present has left
me more comfortable with these data. The results are likely to be very
sensitive to somek ey assumptions, however, and I would like to emphasize
af ew of these. Perhaps the most important is the assumed discount rate.
In addition, to compare the results with those of the Social Security Trust
Fund actuaries, a few additional simulations would be informative, and I
will mention those as well.
Data and Benchmarks
The analysis is based on key inputs from Caldwell et al. (1999), the
CORSIM synthetic data, and the Social Security Beneﬁt Calculator
Social Security’s Treatment of Postwar Americans 253(SSBC). The authors produced their data by running the CORSIM model
from the year 1960 to 2100 and selecting a master sample of particular
groups born between 1945 and 2000. This sample is separated into three
lifetime earnings quintiles—lowest, middle, and highest (discounting at 5
percent from age eighteen to the end of life). The CORSIM data begin
with a sample from the 1960 U.S. Census. The census data are supple-
mented with data from many other sources, including the data from the
High School and Beyond Survey, National Longitudinal Survey, the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, the Survey of Consumer Finances, and others.
CORSIM “grows” the sample demographically and economically to 2100,
based on al arge number of equations and rule-based algorithms. The pro-
cess seems very complicated. My inclination is to be very suspicious of
such data ﬁles, but I was for the most part reassured by the benchmarking
described by the authors.
For example, the longevity of the synthetic data groups seems to corre-
spond rather well to “actual” data. The average longevity is 79.5 for the
ﬁve oldest cohorts and 81.1 for the ﬁve youngest. The most recent Decen-
nial Life Tables, by comparison, show “cross-sectional” life expectancy of
75.4 years. In Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ’s calculations, the life expectancy of
women is 6.3 years longer than that of men. The life tables show a diﬀer-
ence of 6.7 years. According to Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ,h o w ever, whites
live only about two years longer than nonwhites, which is much less than
the life tables’ diﬀerence of 4.9 years. The paper does correctly present a
substantial correlation between earnings and life expectancy. For example,
men in the highest quintile in the 1985 cohort live 7.1 years longer than
men in the lowest quintile. The paper’s account of diﬀerencesb ye d u c a t i o n
is also persuasive. With respect to income, those in the highest quintile
earn over their lifetimes thirty-three to thirty-nine times as much as those
in the lowest quintile. This compares rather well with the lowest versus the
highest decile of lifetime earnings reported in Venti and Wise (2001), based
on the Social Security earnings histories of HRS respondents. We found
that the top decile earned about forty-six times as much as the bottom
decile, with no correction for the top coding at the Social Security covered
earnings limit.
The SSBC ignores the disability insurance part of Social Security and
leaves outf e deral and state taxes of SS beneﬁts. This calculator is ex-
tremely detailed and seems to have been subjected to much checking.
Summary of Results
Because Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ’s results are presented in such a quan-
tity of lengthy tables, I have tried to summarize the key results here. The
ﬁrst results reported in the paper (tables 6.4–6.6) are reproduced from
Caldwell et al. and are summarized in the next two ﬁgures, which show
lifetime tax rates, internal rates of return, and wealth taxes by quintile for
254 Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀthe 1945 and 1995 cohorts. The lifetime tax rate is given by (PVT  PVB)/
PVE, where PVT is the present value of lifetime taxes, PVB is the present
value of beneﬁts, and PVE is the present value of lifetime earnings. The
wealth tax is given by 1  PVB/PVT. Both the wealth tax and the tax rate
arec alculated based on a real discount rate of 5 percent (to which I will
return below). The internal rate of return is determined by choosing the
discount rate such that PVB  PVT. These results show low tax rates and
rather high internal rates of return for the lowest quintile and high tax
rates and low internal rates of return for the middle and especially the
highest quintiles.
The analysis new to this paper examines the distributional eﬀects of
potential Social Security reforms. For example, many reforms would have
a disproportionate eﬀecto nthe lowest income quintile. This is shown with
respect to the tax rate for the 1945 cohort in the next ﬁgure. The ﬁgure
shows changes from the tax rates under the current rules. (The labels are
shorter versions of the labels on the authors’ tables beginning with table
6.8.) The following ﬁgure shows the eﬀecto ntax rates for the 1995 cohort.
Time Horizon and Life Expectancy
These results, like those based on any projections, are subject to many
assumptions and conventions. I would like to mention three in particular
whicha re likely to have an important eﬀecto nthe conclusions. First, the
Fig. 6C.1 Tax Rates and Internal Rates of Return
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Fig. 6C.2 Wealth Taxesauthors conclude that to balance the Social Security budget would require
an immediate 4 percentage point, or 38 percent, increase in the OASI cur-
rent 10.6 percent tax rate. This is more than twice the rate projected by
the Social Security Trust Fund actuaries. The authors’ explanation is that
the Social Security actuaries use a seventy-ﬁve-year projection horizon,
while their results are based on projections through the year 2100. I believe
it would strengthen the results reported in the paper if the authors also
reported results that correspond to the seventy-ﬁve-year horizon used by
the actuaries, conﬁrming that these data yield the trustees’ results when
their convention is used.
Second, longevity assumptions built into the CORSIM data seem to
correspond closely to (and perhaps reﬂect) the Social Security intermedi-
ated e mographic assumptions. Many prominent demographers believe,
however, that actual future realized life spans will be much greater than
the longevity assumptions used here, and the authors emphasize this fact.
Indeed, one demographer has told me that he would not be surprised if
the average girl baby born today lived 100 years. Whatever the truth, death
rates are likely to see declines much greater than those assumed in these
data, which yield the results reported here. More rapid, and I would say
more realistic, declines would suggest a much larger Social Security liabil-
ityu n der the current program provisions and much larger beneﬁts, than
the results the authors report.
Fig. 6C.4 Tax Rate Change by Quintile: C1995
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Finally, the discount rate assumptions can have a very large eﬀect on
the results. The authors use a 5 percent discount rate to make individual
money’s worth calculations, arguing that this rate is justiﬁed because fu-
ture Social Security beneﬁts are risky. They are indeed risky. Many events
could result in beneﬁts much less than promised beneﬁts. Demographic
changes are a key uncertainty, as emphasized above. “Errors,” like the one
that led to double indexing in the 1970s, are another. The political process
could change the plan provisions substantially. Nonetheless, the “right”
rate could be higher or lower than authors assume. Thus, it would be infor-
mative to see some calculations showing how much the discount rate mat-
ters. Here let me simply demonstrate that I believe it would matter a
great deal.
The authors assume a 5 percent real discount rate for the individual
money’s worth calculations. The Social Security actuaries use 3 percent
(the rate that Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ use to assess the eﬀect ofr e f o r ms on
the present value of the Social Security budget). Because the calculated
tax rates and wealth taxes are very sensitive to the assumed discount rate,
perhaps Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ could present some sensitivity analysis to
demonstrate the degree to which this rate matters. The potential sensitivity
to the discount rate can perhaps be demonstrated by observing the rela-
tionship between the internal rate of return, a data-determined calcula-
tion,a nd the wealth tax and the tax rate, which are based on an assumed
5p ercent discount rate. Recall that the relationship between the discount
rate and the ratio of the present value of beneﬁts to the present value of
taxes looks like the line marked by squares in the ﬁgure below. The internal
rate of return is determined by ﬁnding the discount rate such that PVB 
PVT, so that the ratio is one. Thus, when the discount rate is equal to the
internal rate of return, both the wealth tax [1  PVB/PVT] and the tax rate
[(PVT  PVB)/PVE] are equal to zero. For example, if the internal rate
of return is 5 percent and the discount rate is 5 percent, both will be zero.
Then, for discount rates below 5 percent, PVB  PVT, and both the wealth
tax and the tax rate will be negative. For discount rates greater than 5 per-
cent,PVBPVT, and both the wealth tax and the tax rate will be positive.
Fore xample, consider the internal rate of return and the wealth tax for
all nonwhite persons in the lowest quintile in the 1990 cohort. The internal
rate of return is 5.0 percent, and because the assumed discount rate is also
5.0 percent, both the wealth tax (I presume except for rounding error) and
the tax rate are zero. However, for the 1985 cohort in the same quintile,
the internal rate of return is 5.7 percent, the discount rate is less than the
internal rate of return, and the wealth tax and tax rate are negative. For
persons in the middle quintile in the 1985 cohort, the internal rate of return
is only 2.6 percent, so the assumed discount rate is much larger than the
internal rate of return, and the wealth tax and tax rate are very large.
258 Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. KotlikoﬀThe point of the example is to emphasize the sensitivity of the calculated
wealth taxes and tax rates to the assumed discount rate. Both would be
much lower if the assumed discount rate were lower and much higher if
the assumed discount rate were higher.
As another example, consider the internal rate of return and the wealth
tax of all women. The internal rate of return for the middle quintile in the
1945 cohort is 3.0, and the wealth tax is large—53.2 percent. If the as-
sumed discount rate were 3 percent instead of 5 percent, the wealth tax
for this group would be zero. The wealth tax for all other cohorts in the
middle quintile would be negative. The wealth taxes for the lowest quintile
would be more negative than they are. The wealth taxes of the highest
quintile would still be positive, but much lower than the Gokhale and
Kotlikoﬀ estimates. On the other hand, if the discount rate were 7 percent,
all of the wealth taxes would be greater than zero, even for the lowest
quintile—except for the 1950 cohort, for which the wealth tax would be
zero.
As emphasized above, there is no “correct” discount rate, and I have no
reason to believe the one chosen by Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ is either too
high or too low, but I believe some sensitivity analysis would demonstrate
the substantial relationship between the assumed discount rate and the
implied wealth taxes and tax rates.
In short, the results of this paper are striking and sobering. They ought
to be used to help inform the current ﬁnancial status of the Social Security
Fig. 6C.5 Discount Rate, Tax Rate, and Wealth Tax
Social Security’s Treatment of Postwar Americans 259system, the gains or losses that current participants are receiving from the
system, and the distributional eﬀects of potential reforms of the current
system.
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Table 6C.2
Internal Rate of Return, by Quintile Wealth Tax, by Quintile
Lowest Middle Highest Lowest Middle Highest
1945 5.9 3.0 1.7 43.1 53.2 67.8
1950 7.0 3.2 1.6 115.7 48.0 70.0
1955 6.5 3.1 1.3 78.7 49.7 72.8
1960 6.4 3.2 1.2 69.8 50.6 74.5
1965 6.3 3.2 1.3 62.5 50.0 74.3
1970 6.3 3.2 1.2 61.3 49.4 75.2
1975 6.3 3.2 1.4 63.8 49.9 73.1
1980 6.5 3.3 1.3 75.8 47.3 74.4
1985 6.3 3.3 1.4 63.6 48.4 73.2
1990 6.1 3.3 1.3 54.0 47.2 74.0
1995 6.0 3.2 0.9 44.7 48.9 76.3
Table 6C.1
Quintile
Cohort Lowest Middle Highest
Internal Rate of Return
1985 5.7 2.6 1.0
1990 5.0 2.6 0.8
Wealth Tax
1985 28.5 58.4 75.7
1990 0.5 57.3 76.8
Tax Rate
1985 2.9 6.0 5.3
1990 0.0 5.8 5.3
Note: All nonwhite data.
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Gary Burtless described two reasons for the low rates of return for postwar
generations. First, there was a large gift to the early generations of contrib-
utors that later generations are paying for with their payroll taxes. Second,
the investment portfolio for the Social Security Trust Fund is extremely
conservative and earns a much lower expected rate of return than the
benchmark rate of return used to calculate the discount rate used in this
paper. Even if we ignore the gift given to past generations, Social Security
would still appear to be a bad deal for current contributors under the
calculations in this paper. Burtless added that applying a discount factor
of5p ercent would show that almost all insurance would have astoundin-
gly high load factors. The authors defended their 5 percent discount rate,
noting that the average internal rate of return for postwar Americans is
1.9 percent, while inﬂation-indexed government bonds have a return of
more than 4 percent. Even if Social Security beneﬁts are considered to be
riskless assets (which theya re not), it is clear that people are not receiving
ag o o dd e a l .
Burtless also believed that the calculation of tax burdens that people
payu n der the system is based on the assumption that all of the taxes that
support these payments are indeed paid for by the worker. To the extent
that labor does respond to taxation, employers will bear some of the tax
burden,a nd, therefore, all of the tax contributions should not be added to
the ledger as in this paper.
Charles Blahous emphasized the diﬀerence between the tax burden from
Social Security taxes and the total tax burden. Around the year 2015 the
federal government will have to use general revenue to pay the Social Secu-
rity Trust Fund, and by 2030 the burden on general revenue will be approx-
imately 5 percent of payroll. Clearly, the total tax burden will be much
higher for workers entering the labor force in 2015. Consequently, the in-
ternal rate of return for the Social Security system depends on both the
Social Security taxes and the general revenue requirements.
Martin Feldstein pointed out that the magnitude of the tax burden on
future generations would be even higher if deadweight losses were con-
sidered.
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